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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AFTER
GONZALES V. CARHART
Steven G. Calabresi*
This Essay begins in Part I with a doctrinal evaluation of the status
of Washington v. Glucksberg ten years after that decision was
handed down. Discussion begins with consideration of the Roberts
Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart and then turns to the
subject of Justice Kennedy’s views in particular on substantive due
process. In Part II, the Essay goes on to consider whether the
Glucksberg test for substantive due process decision making is correct in light of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Essay concludes in Parts II and III that Glucksberg is right to
confine substantive due process rights recognition to recognition
only of those rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition.
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Introduction
1

The big question on the tenth anniversary of Washington v. Glucksberg
is whether the case is still good law after the intervening decision in Law2
rence v. Texas. Glucksberg appeared to foreshadow the end of free-wheeling
substantive due process analysis until in Lawrence Justice Kennedy seemed
to take back everything that Glucksberg had said. Glucksberg had purported
to limit substantive due process to only those rights that are deeply rooted in
history and tradition, while Lawrence waxed poetic about the Supreme
Court using an unhinged substantive due process doctrine to protect all of
3
the sweet “myster[ies] of human life” from morals laws. Which case is
good law today? Was Justice Kennedy serious when he joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion in Glucksberg? Or was he serious when he wrote Lawrence. Or is he perhaps just deeply conflicted and confused?
This Essay will argue in Part I that Glucksberg is good law today and
that the opinion in Lawrence is void for vagueness. Justice Kennedy’s nar4
row, restrained approach to substantive due process in Gonzales v. Carhart,
the blockbuster partial birth abortion case decided this past term, shows that
he and four other Justices have recommitted themselves to the narrow, restrained approach of Glucksberg in substantive due process cases. This
approach is consistent with other past Kennedy opinions in substantive due
process cases, and with the approach taken by lower federal and state courts
since Lawrence was decided in 2003. I have no doubt that the holding of
Lawrence is good law, and I consider it possible that the case might still
govern in a narrow range of matters involving private, non-commercial sexual acts between two unrelated consenting adults, but I think the
overwhelming majority of future substantive due process cases are going to
be decided, as Gonzales was, with citation to Glucksberg and without reference to Lawrence.
In Parts II and III, I will argue that as a practical matter, there are three
sources to which the Supreme Court can look to identify substantive due
process rights: tradition, current-day consensus, and comparative constitutional law. I will argue that as a legal and policy matter, neither current day
consensus nor the rulings of other constitutional courts around the world are
1.

521 U.S. 702 (1997).

2.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

3. This phrase comes from the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), and from Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court
in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. It has been thought by some to epitomize his approach to substantive
due process cases.
4.

127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
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an appropriate source of new substantive due process rights. Tradition may
be problematic as a source of substantive due process rights as well, and it
therefore ought to be used only in the clearest of cases. As it happens, I will
argue, this is precisely what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
originally meant for that Amendment to do.
I. The Doctrine: Why Lower Federal Court and State Judges
Must Follow GLUCKSBERG and Not LAWRENCE
The first issue one must consider in any ten-year retrospective on
Glucksberg is whether it or the intervening opinion in Lawrence governs the
Supreme Court’s approach to substantive due process cases. I will first address this question by considering the Supreme Court’s decision last term in
Gonzales v. Carhart; then I will look at Justice Kennedy’s views on substantive due process; and finally I will look at recent lower federal court and
state court decisions.
A. The Roberts Court Speaks: Gonzales v. Carhart
The decision this past term in Gonzales v. Carhart, the partial birth abortion case, was eagerly awaited by many as an indicator of how the
appointments of John Roberts and Samuel Alito might have reshaped the
Supreme Court on the issue of abortion rights. Would the new Court over5
rule Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
6
7
Casey, or Stenberg v. Carhart? What would be the Court’s approach to the
question of abortion rights? What would be its approach with regard to following precedent? Finally, and of critical interest here, what would be the
new Court’s approach to substantive due process? Would the substitution of
Roberts and Alito for William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor change
the balance of the Court on matters of finding new constitutional rights unmoored to text and history.
The opinion in Gonzales offers only cryptic hints on these questions, but
the hints all point to Glucksberg. Significantly, the opinion of the Court was
written by Justice Kennedy, the author of Lawrence and the probable swing
vote on the current Court. Kennedy’s opinion was joined in full by Chief
Justice Roberts and by Justice Alito. Strikingly, Kennedy’s opinion was also
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Lawrence and Casey dissenters,
although these latter two Justices did sign a brief concurrence indicating that
8
they still favored the overruling of Roe and of Casey. The opinion in Gonzales therefore commanded five votes and represents the most definitive

5.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

6.

505 U.S. 833.

7.

530 U.S. 914 (2000).

8.

Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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statement to date from the Roberts Court of its approach to substantive due
process methodology.
There are three significant hints in Gonzales that Justice Kennedy favors
the approach of Glucksberg over Lawrence. First, his opinion cites Glucksberg
approvingly twice, but it never once cites his prior opinion in Lawrence or the
expansive language on substantive due process, liberty, and the sweet mystery
9
of life that the Lawrence opinion quoted from Casey. One cite to Glucksberg
10
reaffirms the government’s interest in protecting life while the other quotes
Glucksberg as saying that there can be no doubt the government “has an inter11
est in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”
Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales therefore appears to resurrect Glucksberg
and to ignore Lawrence.
Second, at the beginning of his analysis in Part II of the Gonzales opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledges that “[t]he principles set forth in the
joint opinion in [Casey] did not find support from all those who join the in12
stant opinion;” he then adds that “[w]hatever one’s views concerning the
Casey joint opinion, it is evident a premise central to its conclusion—that
the government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life—would be repudiated were the Court now to affirm the
13
judgments of the Courts of Appeals.” Justice Kennedy then proceeds to
talk about the state’s interest in fetal life with no further attention to—or
discussion whatsoever of—a woman’s liberty interest in procuring abortions. The failure of the majority opinion in Gonzales to in any way reaffirm
the abortion right derived from Roe and Casey is striking. It adds to the
sense that Gonzales is a pro-judicial restraint, anti-substantive due process
decision.
The third hint, and the most strikingly novel feature of Gonzales v.
Carhart, is its rejection of the easy use of facial challenges rather than as14
applied challenges in abortion cases. This represents a departure from the
Court’s practice in Stenberg v. Carhart, as Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent
15
points out. This cautious, pro-judicial restraint approach suggests a greatly
reduced role for the Court in inventing new constitutional rights that is dramatically opposed to the expansive language of Casey and Lawrence.
Ginsburg’s dissent notes this in frustration when she quotes Casey: “Some
of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of
morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the

9.
10.
(1997)).

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732–35

11.

Id. at 1633 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731).

12.

Id. at 1626.

13.

Id.

14.

Id. at 1638–39.

15.

Id. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.” The Gonzales Court
appears to disagree with Justice Ginsburg that it is the Supreme Court’s obligation to define the liberty of all. Justice Ginsburg also cites Lawrence as
saying that “[f]or many persons [objections to homosexual conduct] are not
trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and
17
moral principles.” She adds that the Lawrence Court said that “the power
of the State may not be used ‘to enforce these views on the whole society
18
through operation of the criminal law.’ ” Clearly, the Gonzales Court takes
a different view from the Casey and Lawrence Courts when it comes to government enforcement of morals legislation.
Technically, the holdings of Gonzales, Casey, and Lawrence are all consistent with one another, but Kennedy’s writing style is dramatically
different and more restrained in Gonzales than it was in the prior cases. It is
worth stressing that Justice Kennedy did not need to write the narrow opinion he did in Gonzales to reach the result he appears to have believed is
correct. He could perfectly well have chosen to write a more ambivalent
controlling concurrence and to have left Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
to speak for themselves. The fact that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
were able to talk Justice Kennedy out of doing this and into producing an
opinion that all five restraintist Justices could join is a striking achievement.
If Justice Kennedy sticks with an insistence on as applied over facial challenges in future substantive due process cases, there will be a whole lot
fewer new constitutional rights that will be found either by the Supreme
Court or by lower federal and state courts relying on the Supreme Court’s
loose language. Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales seems not to regard the
courts as the arbiters of our liberty but as the modest adjudicators of very
concrete cases and controversies in situations where the Court absolutely
must rule because the facts force it to do so. Gonzales v. Carhart, with its
19
rejection of judicial supremacy, its insistence on there being one opinion
for the Court, and its narrow and modest language, is the polar opposite of
Lawrence v. Texas. Gonzales should be read as the first Roberts Court substantive due process decision and as a clear indicator that the Roberts Court
will henceforth produce much more modest substantive due process decisions than the late Rehnquist Court did. This modest judicial role happens to
be the very one that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito defended so ably
20
in their confirmation hearings.

16.

Id. at 1647 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1973)).

17.

Id. at 1647–48 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)).

18.

Id. at 1648 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571).

19.

The classic statement of judicial supremacy came in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

20. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005).
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B. Whither Justice Kennedy?
This raises rather insistently, however, the question of what Justice
Kennedy himself really thinks about the role of the Supreme Court in substantive due process cases. How could the author of Lawrence and the author
of Gonzales be the same person? Only Justice Kennedy knows the answer to
this question, but it is worth noting that Justice Kennedy is now about to observe the twentieth anniversary of his appointment to the Supreme Court—
during which time he has had ample opportunity to carve out a role for himself in substantive due process rights creation. What does Kennedy’s record
over the last twenty years indicate about his views on judicial activism versus
judicial restraint—and on substantive due process in particular?
First, the hype surrounding Lawrence obscured the fact that over the last
twenty years Justice Kennedy has unapologetically signed on to some rather
restraintist substantive due process decisions. Justice Kennedy signed Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s restrained opinion in Glucksberg without reservation
and that opinion clearly indicated that substantive due process rights were
only to be found where they were deeply rooted in history and tradition.
Unlike Justice O’Connor, who joined the Glucksberg opinion but wrote a
21
narrowing concurrence, Justice Kennedy joined Glucksberg without writing separately at all.
Justice Kennedy also endorsed a version of the deeply rooted in history
and tradition test when he joined Scalia’s opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald
22
D., but Rehnquist’s formulation in Glucksberg takes the test further than
Justice Kennedy was willing to go in Michael H. The only significant difference between Michael H. and Glucksberg is that in the former, Justice Scalia
insisted in footnote six that one must look at tradition at the most specific
23
level of generality available, while in Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist
24
was a bit more ambiguous on that point. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor
25
signed all of Scalia’s opinion in Michael H. except for footnote six. Thus
the most accurate description of Rehnquist’s achievement in Washington v.
Glucksberg may be that he got Justices Kennedy and O’Connor to sign on to
a similar version of the deeply rooted in history and tradition test that Justice Scalia had been unable to get them to commit to in Michael H.
One must ask, however, why Justice Kennedy objected to the language
in footnote six. The answer is evident from the brief concurring opinion in
Michael H. that Justices Kennedy and O’Connor filed. In that opinion, the
two swing justices noted that Scalia’s proposed methodology for substantive
due process cases would have been inconsistent with some of the Court’s

21.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736–38 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

22.

491 U.S. 110, 123–27 (1989) (plurality opinion).

23.

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.

24.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (requiring only a “careful description” of the tradition).

25.

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 112.
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26

prior substantive due process decisions. The most obvious decision that
27
footnote six of Michael H. is inconsistent with is Griswold v. Connecticut.
Thus, the fact that Justice Kennedy joined both Glucksberg and Michael H.
probably signifies that he believes in history and tradition as a guide in substantive due process cases but thinks that Griswold was correctly decided or
at least that it should not be overruled. This position has been publicly de28
29
fended by such conservatives as Ken Starr and Charles Fried, and hardly
leads to the conclusion that Roe v. Wade was correctly decided. Indeed, there
is one Justice of the Supreme Court, Byron White, who voted with the majority in Griswold and with the dissent in Roe. Justice White went on to
30
write the paean to judicial restraint in Bowers v. Hardwick which Justice
Kennedy later overruled in Lawrence v. Texas.
Could one believe in history, tradition, and judicial restraint as the
guideposts for substantive due process and still think Griswold was correctly
decided? I think the answer is plainly yes, although I think Griswold was
wrongly decided. Justice White believed in judicial restraint but was in the
majority in Griswold and so was Justice Harlan the younger. The Connecticut statute struck down in Griswold was the only state law of its kind in the
31
nation and it had almost never been enforced. It was a real outlier when the
Griswold case reached the Supreme Court in 1965. There was no substantial
history of state regulation of the use of contraceptives by married couples in
32
this country. The Griswold decision changed no long settled practices, disrupted no expectations, and produced very little legal change even in the
state of Connecticut. Its significance was one hundred percent symbolic. A
conservative Justice could perfectly well have believed in judicial restraint,
have believed that substantive due process rights had to be deeply rooted in
history and tradition, and still have thought, as Justices Harlan and White
did, that the Connecticut birth control statute in Griswold was unconstitu33
tional.
Could Justice Kennedy have also refused to join footnote six of Michael
H. in part because he thought Roe was rightly decided as an original matter?
It is theoretically possible, but it seems unlikely. Justice Kennedy is reported

26. Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
27.

Id.; see generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.

28.

Kenneth W. Starr, First Among Equals 120–142 (2002).

29.

Charles Fried, Order and Law 71–88 (1991).

30.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

31. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 506 (White, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S 497,
502 (1961)).
32. See, e.g., Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Woman in the Catholic Hospital, 31 J. Legis.
69, 75 (2004).
33.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
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to have initially voted to overrule Roe at the Justices’ conference in Casey.
Kennedy also joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Webster v.
35
Reproductive Health Services, which would have gutted Roe. He wrote a
36
passionate dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart as well as this past term’s majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, both approving of efforts to outlaw
partial birth abortion. And he declined to write an opinion endorsing a constitutional right to assisted suicide in Glucksberg. All of these facts suggest
that Justice Kennedy has stuck with Roe v. Wade, to the extent that he has,
because of stare decisis concerns and not because he thinks the case was
originally correctly decided. The joint opinion in Casey comes close to say37
ing as much. I think there is no evidence on the record that Justice
Kennedy would have voted with the majority in Roe in 1973 and a lot of
evidence that he would have been with Justice White in dissent.
It is worth remembering at this point that Justice White complained in
his dissent in Doe v. Bolton, a companion case to Roe, that the Supreme
Court perhaps had the raw power to do what it did in that case but that the
38
majority was guilty of using that raw power improvidently and unwisely.
Whereas Griswold struck down the law of one state, a law which was not
even being enforced, Roe struck down the abortion laws of all fifty states.
Roe was much more activist than Griswold; Roe used the Supreme Court as
an engine of social change while Griswold was, in practice, a reaffirmation
of the status quo. This raises the question whether in his twenty years on the
Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy has used substantive due process doctrine
as an engine of social change. There are two areas of case law where Justice
Kennedy might be argued to have done this: cases like BMW of North
39
America, Inc. v. Gore that set outer limits on the reasonableness of punitive
damages awards and gay rights cases like Lawrence v. Texas.
The punitive damages awards cases have so far set only the vaguest limits on punitive damages awards. They are not an effort to alter radically the
status quo so much as they are a response to the torts revolution of the 1960s
and 1970s. Moreover, while these cases have been decided as substantive
due process cases, there is an express clause in the Constitution which could
theoretically support the BMW v. Gore line of cases: the Eighth Amend40
ment’s ban on excessive fines. Thus, both the textual underpinnings and the
34. Edward P. Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the
Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court 470 (1998). When he changed his mind, Supreme
Court law clerks did an end of year skit in which Kennedy was portrayed as “Flipper” the dolphin.
35.

Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 513–21 (1989) (plurality opinion).

36.

530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

37. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (“[T]he reservations
any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of
individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare decisis.”).
38.

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).

39.

517 U.S. 559 (1996).

40. I recognize that Justice Scalia has argued that a punitive damage award by a jury is not a
fine as he reads the original meaning of the word “fine,” but the point is debatable. See BMW of N.
Am., 517 U.S. at 598–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying excessive punitive damages do not violate
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modest impact of the BMW v. Gore line of cases differentiate it entirely
from Roe v. Wade. Kennedy’s signing on to the use of substantive due process to rein in punitive damages does not vitiate his endorsement of tradition
in substantive due process cases in Glucksberg and Michael H.
This brings us to Lawrence v. Texas, which admittedly contains sweeping but almost incomprehensible language about how it is the role of the
Supreme Court to define the liberty of us all and to protect us against all
41
morals laws. The language of Lawrence is plainly incompatible with the
deeply-rooted-in-history-and-tradition test that Justice Kennedy signed on to
in Glucksberg and Michael H. This raises the question whether Justice Kennedy meant in writing Lawrence to indicate that the Court was back into the
role of mandating sweeping social change.
The first question to consider is whether Lawrence in fact was a big, judicially mandated, social change opinion, like Roe, or whether it was a
symbolic opinion that changed very little in practice, like Griswold. I think
the answer is that Lawrence is a whole lot more like Griswold than it is like
Roe. The opinion in Lawrence invalidated the sodomy laws of only thirteen
states. Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia had repealed laws
42
criminalizing sodomy between 1960 and 2003. The thirteen state laws held
to be unconstitutional in Lawrence were, like the law in Griswold, almost
43
never enforced. Even Justice Thomas, a dissenter in Lawrence, called laws
against sodomy “silly” and said he would vote to repeal them if he were a
44
legislator, much as Justice Potter Stewart had said about the Connecticut
45
birth control statute in Griswold. As a practical matter, very little changed as
a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. Instead, it is an
acknowledgment of the gay rights revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s—
46
thirty years after that revolution happened! That does not make Lawrence
47
good constitutional law, and I have argued previously and will argue again
below that it is bad constitutional law. But this is not an example of the Supreme Court acting as an engine of radical social change. Lawrence is at most
an example of the Supreme Court ratifying a relatively recent current day
the due process clause); Ornelos v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The problem of excessive punitive damage awards on the scale we have today is as new to us as the
use of libel and slander suits is new to the suppression of First Amendment speech. If the Court
could use the First Amendment appropriately, as it did in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), to rein in libel and slander judgments, it can just as legitimately use the Excessive Fines
Clause to rein in run-away punitive damages. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (1984) (Bork,
J., concurring).
41.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).

42.

Id. at 596.

43.

Id. at 572 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (1986)).

44.

Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

45.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).

46. David Carter, Stonewall: The Riots that Sparked the Gay Revolution 2
(2004) (“It is common today to trace the tremendous gains made for lesbian and gay rights since the
early 1970s back to the Stonewall Riots of 1969.”).
47.

Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *.
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consensus that using the criminal law to punish sodomy is excessive. It is a
huge mistake to equate Lawrence and Roe. The one was an affirmation of
the status quo while the other was an attempt to do again what the Court
48
mistakenly thought it had done in Brown v. Board of Education.
An immediate response might be that my reading of Lawrence is radically less apocalyptic than Scalia’s reading in his dissent in that case. Justice
Scalia argued in Lawrence that the opinion was a harbinger of gay marriage
49
and the end of all morals laws. Many other commentators hailed Lawrence
as foreshadowing the beginning of a new era of substantive due process ac50
tivism. Was Justice Scalia right or wrong? How much did Lawrence affect
the culture war over how far the country ought to go in recognizing gay
rights?
The main effect of Lawrence is that it may have been an impetus for the
51
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to recognize a right to gay marriage.
The stress here should be on the word “may,” because even before Lawrence,
the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Vermont had recognized a right to gay civil
52
unions in those states. But even assuming Lawrence aided the legalization of
gay marriage in Massachusetts, a huge number of states responded to
Massachusetts’s legalization of gay marriage by banning it by initiative,
53
referendum, or statute. Thus, as of 2007, four years after Lawrence, little has
changed. At most, it led to the legalization of gay marriage in one state and of
54
civil unions in six states. This is hardly an indication that the Lawrence
Court acted as a radical engine of social change.
Moving beyond gay marriage, has Lawrence appreciably affected the
culture war over gay rights in other ways, either as a result of court rulings
or of policy changes? The answer is clearly no. The “don’t ask, don’t tell”

48. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Lawrence did not legalize gay sex but
instead ratified a sweeping change in social attitudes that had occurred a generation before that case
was decided. Roe, in contrast, invalidated the abortion laws of all fifty states, even the so-called
“liberalized” abortion law of New York state. Moreover, the fifty state laws struck down in Roe were
laws that were actually being enforced whereas the thirteen state laws struck down in Lawrence
were not. Roe actually changed the law on the ground; Lawrence did not.
49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05 (“If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘no
legitimate state interest’ for purposes of proscribing that conduct . . . what justification could there
possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising ‘[t]he liberty
protected by the Constitution?’ ” (citations omitted)).
50. See, e.g., Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 23, 26 (2005); Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due
Process, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 63, 64 (2006); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1899–1900 (2004).
51. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (citing Lawrence,
539 U.S. 558).
52.
1999).

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 70 (Haw. 1993); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt.

53. Vickie Chachere, Gay Marriage Loses Court Fight District Court in Florida Upholds
Defense of Marriage Act, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jan. 23, 2005, at A11.
54.

See Lexington: Out and Proud Parents, Economist, June 30, 2007, at 81.
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55

policy for gays in the military remains unchanged. The failure of federal
civil rights laws to ban discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual
orientation remains unchanged. George W. Bush left in place an executive
order of Bill Clinton’s forbidding the federal government from discriminat56
ing on the basis of sexual orientation in hiring, but he made that decision
when he took office on January 20, 2001. If a conservative Republican
president like George W. Bush was willing to ban hiring discrimination
against gays in 2001, how radical could a 2003 Supreme Court decision legalizing gay sex have been? The answer is that Lawrence itself was not
radical at all. It could have become something more radical, but as of 2007
that has plainly failed to happen. If the Democrats win the presidency in
2008 and make three new Supreme Court appointments, Lawrence might be
reinterpreted to be something more radical than it now is. But if that happens, the cause of the change will lie not with Justice Kennedy but with the
American people.
1. Lower Court and State Court Rulings
There is, however, even more proof that in 2007, even before Gonzales
v. Carhart, it is Glucksberg that states the rule of substantive due process
and Lawrence that is the exception. A recent student note in the Michigan
57
Law Review called The Glucksberg Renaissance examined the citation and
use of Glucksberg and of Lawrence in lower federal court and state court
58
opinions since Lawrence was decided in 2003. This note found that lower
federal and state courts are overwhelmingly relying on Glucksberg and ig59
noring Lawrence. This is probably in part because these courts think it is
up to the Supreme Court to make new substantive due process case law, if it
wants to, and in part because Glucksberg gives courts a good way of getting
60
rid of spurious claims of constitutional right while Lawrence does not.
These lower and state court decisions to follow Glucksberg and ignore
Lawrence suggest that the latter is essentially void for vagueness. No one
knows what it means, including, as Gonzales v. Carhart now suggests,
Justice Kennedy himself. The responsible thing for a lower or state court to
do now is to follow Glucksberg over Lawrence, except when dealing with
consensual, noncommercial sexual activity by no more than two unrelated
adults that occurs in private and does not involve violence.

55.

10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).

56.

Exec. Order No. 13,160, 3 C.F.R. 279 (2001).

57. Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since
Lawrence v. Texas, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 409 (2006).
58.

Id.

59.

Id. at 411.

60.

Id. at 442–43.
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2. Other Substantive Due Process Rights
Justice Kennedy’s support for Griswold and his opinion in Lawrence
suggest that he thinks there is a realm of sexual autonomy that is beyond the
reach of the government. But in his twenty years on the Supreme Court he
has never used the sweet mystery of life to protect, for example, polygamy,
prostitution, incest, drug use, assisted suicide, or even the right of a parent to
control the upbringing of her child. Lawrence itself specifically does not
apply to polygamy, gay marriage, prostitution or incest, and there is nothing
in Kennedy’s twenty-year record on the Court that would make one think it
did apply to those things. Justice Kennedy has read the First Amendment
61
very broadly in pornography and obscenity cases, but those are the only
other area in which he has to date supported protecting so-called sexual liberties. Kennedy’s values seem more Californian and suburban than they are
Bohemian. Contraceptive use, consensual oral and anal sex, and pornography may be protected, but not prostitution, polygamy, incest, or
sadomasochism.
With respect to drug use, Justice Kennedy had a chance on eminently
solid federalism grounds to forbid the use of the Controlled Substances Act to
prosecute possession of small amounts of medical marijuana. Kennedy’s na62
tive state of California and eleven other states had voted to do precisely that.
If Justice Kennedy had had any leaning to interpret the sweet mystery of life
as including drug use, surely one would have heard about it in Gonzales v.
63
Raich? To the contrary, Justice Kennedy went out of his way—in violation of
his usual beliefs about federalism—to make sure that possession of small
amounts of medicinal marijuana would remain a federal crime. No aging
flower child here!
The same thing happened with assisted suicide. Many defenders of Roe
64
thought it was a case about the right to control one’s bodily integrity. If so,
a right to assisted suicide might have followed from Roe. But we know that
Justice Kennedy categorically rejected such a right in Glucksberg, a case he
65
approvingly cited twice in Gonzales v. Carhart. Whatever the sweet mystery of life encompasses, assisted suicide apparently is not on the list.
3. Troxel and Historical Substantive Due Process
This leaves at least one other important substantive due process right
and case undiscussed so far: the right of a parent to control the upbringing

61. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444–53 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
62. See Trip Jennings, Medical Pot Users Shut Out By N.M., Albuquerque J., Aug. 16,
2007, at A1.
63.

545 U.S. 1 (2005).

64. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 11, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
(No. 96-110).
65.

See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
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of her child by controlling grandparental visitation rights. As it happens, this
precise issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in its June 5, 2000 deci66
sion in Troxel v. Granville. The case split the Justices six to three in favor
of finding a parental substantive due process right that was deeply rooted in
67
history and tradition to prevent a state judge’s order of grandparental visits.
A plurality opinion for four Justices was written by Justice O’Connor and
signed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer;
68
Justices Souter and Thomas concurred in the judgment. Justices Stevens,
69
70
Scalia, and Kennedy each wrote separate dissents refusing to find a substantive due process right. Justice Scalia, changing his position from
Michael H. and Glucksberg, denied that any judicially enforceable substantive due process rights exist, including even those that are deeply rooted in
71
history and tradition. Justice Stevens dissented in part because of the facial
breadth of the parental substantive due process challenge, which is striking
given that he was unconcerned about this very issue in Gonzales v. Carhart
72
where he joined Ginsburg’s dissent.
73
The most striking dissent for purposes of this Essay was Kennedy’s.
Justice Kennedy picked up on Stevens’s complaint about facial substantive
due process challenges and denied that the Washington state statute under
review was invalid on its face, although he conceded that he could think of
as-applied substantive due process challenges to it that might succeed in his
74
view. Kennedy’s rejection of a broad facial challenge in Troxel is striking
because of his similar rejection of a broad facial challenge in Gonzales v.
Carhart. Opponents of substantive due process who are eager to win
Kennedy’s critical fifth vote ought to remember that he has twice objected to
broad facial challenges in this area.
Kennedy’s dissent in Troxel is also striking because it twice cites
Glucksberg as the authoritative last word on the test that ought to be used in
75
defining new substantive due process rights. The first cite quotes Glucksberg
as saying that substantive due process rights must come from “[o]ur Nation’s
history, legal traditions, and practices,” while the second cite concludes as
follows:
In light of the inconclusive historical record and case law, as well as
the almost universal adoption of the best interests standard for visitation

66.

530 U.S. 57 (2000).

67.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 59, 65–66.

68.

Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

69.

Id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

70.

Id. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

71.

Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

72.

Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007).

73.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

74.

Id. at 95.

75.

Id. at 96, 100.
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disputes, I would be hard pressed to conclude the right to be free of such
76
review in all cases is itself “ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ”

Here again Justice Kennedy relies on history and tradition, as well as
present day consensus, in finding new substantive due process rights.
Kennedy’s reliance on Palko reveals him to be a disciple of Felix Frankfurter and the second Justice Harlan—as does the very restrained tone of his
77
dissent in Troxel. Indeed, when discussing Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v.
78
Society of Sisters, Justice Kennedy even says that those two substantive
due process antecedents of Troxel v. Granville might have been viewed by
79
the Court today as First Amendment cases. The comment seems to confine
and narrow Meyer and Pierce rather than to extend them to new contexts.
The final strain of Kennedy’s dissent in Troxel which bears comment is
that he openly acknowledges that not all children today are raised in traditional two-parent families and that for some children a grandparent or
80
another relative may be a parental substitute. Justice Kennedy neither approves nor disapproves of this. He merely acknowledges it as a reality that
81
makes him hesitate to constitutionalize this area of family law. This aspect
of Kennedy’s dissent foreshadows Lawrence in its realism about current day
consensus and practice with respect to matters bearing on the family and on
sex.
Kennedy’s dissent in Troxel is thus of a piece with (1) his joining of the
opinion in Glucksberg, (2) his refusal over twenty years on the Supreme
Court to develop new constitutional rights except for in Lawrence, and
(3) his very restrained opinion this past term in Gonzales v. Carhart. I deny
that the jury is still out on where Justice Kennedy stands on substantive due
process. I think he is a follower of the position staked out by Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Griswold. Justice Kennedy may not be Robert
Bork, but he is not William Brennan or Harry Blackmun either. Those lower
federal court and state court judges wondering whether to follow the doctrine of Glucksberg or of Lawrence ought plainly to follow Glucksberg. The
vast weight of the evidence suggests that is the position that commands five
votes today on the Supreme Court, especially in light of Gonzales v.
Carhart.
There is one final objection to saying that Justice Kennedy believes in
following tradition when evaluating alleged violations of substantive due
process rights: his apparent endorsement of Griswold and his opinion in
Lawrence both protect traditions that are not deeply rooted in American history. Whatever the roots of Griswold in history and tradition, it is clear that
76. Id. at 100 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
77.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

78.

268 U.S. 510 (1925).

79.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95.

80.

Id. at 98.

81.

Id.
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no reasonable observer of the legal system would ever have argued prior to
1960 that a right to engage in oral or anal sex was deeply rooted in history
and tradition given that at that time all fifty states outlawed sodomy. This
point is true, and it is one of the reasons why I think Kennedy’s opinion in
Lawrence is wrong. I think Justice Kennedy would respond, however, by
saying that in Lawrence he was also following a tradition of American
commitment to liberty as that commitment has evolved over time.
82
Kennedy is thus a Burkean, not an originalist. He does not ask what
traditions were in place in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. He is with Justice Harlan in viewing tradition as a gradually evolving
and changing source of guidance. Unlike Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
Kennedy does not seek to drive the evolution of our traditions; he seeks
mostly to discern it—hence his emphasis on current day consensus along
with tradition in substantive due process law.
I do not agree with Justice Kennedy’s approach, but I also think it is a
mistake to equate it with the activism of Roe v. Wade. This gives a mistaken
sense to lower federal court and state court judges striving to follow the
Supreme Court’s guidance of what Lawrence, taken in context, really
signifies. Justice Kennedy’s twenty years on the Supreme Court make it clear
that Lawrence must be read and harmonized with Glucksberg and with his
consistent failure to find new constitutional rights unmoored to text and
history. Judges seeking to follow Supreme Court doctrine in substantive due
process cases should follow Glucksberg.
II. Constitutional Theory: Tradition and Consensus as Sources
of Substantive Due Process Rights
Moving beyond the analysis of what the Supreme Court doctrine is, the
question arises as to what the Supreme Court’s role ought to be in substantive due process cases. What position ought a new Justice to take with
respect to following either the implications of Glucksberg or of Lawrence? I
have previously expressed my views on this subject in an article in the Ohio
State Law Journal where I made it clear that I think Lawrence was wrongly
83
decided. I will not rehearse here what I explained at length in the Ohio
State article but will briefly summarize my argument there instead.
For me as an originalist, the very notion of substantive due process is an
oxymoron. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
protect “life, liberty, or property” absolutely: it merely says that if the state
deprives a person of any of those things it must do so with “due process of
84
law.” The two Due Process Clauses ought never to be read as being a constraint on arbitrary and capricious lawmaking; they are only a constraint on
arbitrary and capricious action by executive personnel, such as the King’s

82.

See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 509, 509–10 (1996).

83.

Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *.

84.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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sheriffs. Under an originalist reading of the Due Process Clauses, therefore,
there is no requirement that legislation be “reasonable” in the eyes of federal
and state judges.
A. Another Home for Substantive Due Process: The Privileges
and Immunities Clause
As I argued in the Ohio State article, analysis cannot end there for a
good originalist because there is another Clause in Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment that is a far more plausible basis for judicial
protection of unenumerated individual rights from legislative
85
infringement—the Privileges or Immunities Clause. This Clause forbids
the states from making or enforcing “any law which shall abridge the
86
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” This Clause
87
was gutted by the Supreme Court in the Slaughterhouse Cases, but for a
good originalist like me that does not matter. The next question then is
whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects unenumerated
individual rights or whether it imposes a reasonableness requirement on
state legislatures.
The plain text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause suggests that it
protects a category of fundamental rights called “privileges or immunities”
from abridgement (“lessening”) by the making or enforcing of any state
law. The Clause thus does not read on its face as if it imposes a reasonableness requirement policed by courts on state legislatures. Examination
of the original historical meaning of the Clause confirms that this is indeed
how the Clause should be read. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was
88
meant to be the most important Clause in the Amendment, and its language was borrowed from the analogous Privileges and Immunities Clause
89
90
of Article IV which itself came from the Articles of Confederation.
The history of this Clause is somewhat complex, and it is best laid out
91
in a superb law review article by John Harrison. Most of the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment understood the words “privileges or immunities” to mean what Bushrod Washington (George’s nephew) had said they
meant in the dicta of a rambling opinion he wrote when riding circuit as an

85.

See Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1108.

86.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

87.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–79 (1873).

88. See John Harrison, Review of Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law, 89 Va. L.
Rev. 1779, 1790–91 (2003) (book review).
89. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
90.
91.
(1992).

Articles of Confederation art. IV (U.S. 1781).
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385
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Associate Justice in a case called Corfield v. Coryell. Washington’s dictum, which was quoted over and over again by the framers of the
93
Fourteenth Amendment, reads as follows:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to
those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which
have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would
perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however,
be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by
the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right
of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain
actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or
impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens,
which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state
94
in which it is to be exercised.

As I explained in my Ohio State Law Journal article, two passages in
95
Justice Washington’s opinion here deserve major emphasis. First, Justice
Washington is explicit that “Privileges and Immunities” is an expression
96
that is confined to those rights “which are, in their nature, fundamental.”
He said those fundamental rights belong to “citizens of all free governments,” and they “have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming
97
free, independent and sovereign.” It is thus crystal clear that, under Justice Washington’s approach in Corfield, a right must be deeply rooted in
98
American history and tradition for it to be a “Privilege and Immunity.”
Such rights must have been first, recognized at all times, and second, they
92. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230); Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal,
supra note *, at 1111–15. To top matters off, Washington probably construed the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV incorrectly. Id.
93.

John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 28 (1980).

94.

Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52 (emphasis added).

95.

Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1110.

96.

Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. (emphasis added).

97.

Id. (emphasis added).

98.

Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1110
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must have been recognized since 1776 when the States became free, independent, and sovereign. At a bare minimum then under Washington’s
approach in Corfield, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects, at most, fundamental rights that were widely
99
recognized in 1868 when the amendment was ratified. This means that
the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was that it
protected rights so deeply rooted in history and tradition that they were
widely followed in 1868. The correct test then, as a matter of positive law,
for discerning substantive due process rights is that they must be deeply
rooted in history and tradition.
There is a second statement in the famous Corfield dictum which also
suggests that the judicial restraint of Glucksberg is the right course for the
Court. Justice Washington said that even fundamental rights, which are
deeply rooted in the nation’s history and traditions, are “subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
100
general good of the whole.” This passage suggests that state exercises of
the police power with a strong historical pedigree remain permissible even
101
if a fundamental right is burdened thereby! Thus, compelling governmental interests trump even fundamental rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. A long history of the use of the police power to
forbid oral or anal sex or assisted suicide would thus trump any fundamental right to engage in those activities because such a use of the police
power would suggest a compelling governmental interest. It is thus absolutely crystal clear as a matter of positive Constitutional law that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects at most rights deeply rooted in
history and tradition that date back to 1868, and that even those rights can
be regulated by “just” restraints prescribed “for the general good of the
102
whole.”
B. Individual and Class-Based Rights under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause
John Harrison has argued further that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect individual rights at
99. One could argue that following Justice Washington literally means that only privileges
and immunities recognized in 1776, and not any additional ones recognized in 1868, ought to be
protected. This, however, overlooks the fact that the 1823 decision in Corfield was construing a
Clause that was in Article IV of the Constitution of 1787 and that derived from a clause in the Articles of Confederation. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. It is thus fair to say that for that clause, given its
history, one must look for rights that were fundamental in 1776. The Privileges or Immunities language in the Fourteenth Amendment, in contrast, was added in 1868. It is thus at least arguable that
the referent point for rights deeply rooted in history and tradition is different for the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than it is for the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV. What is clear, however, is that for a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be
deeply rooted in history and tradition it must at least have been so recognized in 1868.
100.

Id.

101.

Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1110–11.

102.

Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
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all. He says it protects only against discriminatory class-based legisla103
tion. In Harrison’s view, only these types of laws “abridge” (or shorten)
104
privileges or immunities in the way the Black Codes, for example, clearly
105
did. Harrison argues the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is
an anti-discrimination clause that protects out-of-staters from being treated
106
differently than are in-state citizens. He thus argues that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a ban on discrimination
107
and not a protection of individual rights at all.
As I said in my Ohio State Law Journal article, Harrison’s argument is
impeccably well researched, and I think he shows beyond a doubt that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause forbids class-based discrimination like the
Black Codes. I part company with him, however, in concluding that the
Clause does not also protect those individual rights so deeply rooted in history and tradition that they might have been on Washington’s Corfield list.
The constitutional text plainly forbids the states from making or enforcing
any law which shall “abridge” privileges or immunities. The question thus is
what does the word “abridge” mean? Does it forbid only class-based discrimination or does it also protect individuals from abridgements?
The word “abridge” is used in two other places in the Constitution: once
with an anti-discrimination meaning and once with an individual-rightsprotecting meaning. The Fifteenth Amendment uses it in an antidiscrimination sense when it forbids laws that “den[y]” or “abridge[]” the
108
right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
The First Amendment uses the word “abridg[e]” in an individual-rights109
protecting sense when it bars laws that “abridg[e]” the freedom of speech.
What then is the original meaning of the word abridge?
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary, which would have controlled the meaning
of the word “abridge” as it is used in the individual rights sense in the First
110
Amendment, offers the following three definitions of the word abridge:
1.

To make shorter in words, keeping still the same substance. . . .

2.

To contract, to diminish, to cut short. . . .

103.

See Harrison, supra note 91, at 1420–24.

104. Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 301–02 (5th ed. 2006).
105.

See Harrison, supra note 91, at 1421.

106.

Id. at 1414–15.

107. For an excellent discussion of how this reading of the clause can be harmonized with the
Equal Protection Clause, see Harrison, supra note 91, at 1433–51.
108.

U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.

109.

Id. amend. I.

110. Samuel Johnson’s dictionary is widely recognized as having been the authoritative dictionary that the Framers would have consulted at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Bill of
Rights. See Bernard Schwartz, Takings Clause—“Poor Relation” No More?, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 417,
420 (1994) (citing Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary as “the only one in existence when the Bill of Rights
was adopted”).
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3. To deprive of; in which sense it is followed by the particle from, or of,
111
preceding the thing taken away. . . .

These meanings are confirmed by the etymological origins of the word
“abridge” which comes from the Latin word “abbreviare” which meant to
make brief. “The sense ‘to make shorter, condense’ appeared about 1384 in
112
the Wycliffe Bible.” Abridgments of privileges or immunities then would
occur whenever those rights are contracted, shortened, or to some degree
taken away.
As I said in my Ohio State Law Journal article, the paradigmatic taking
away or shortening of rights that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
meant to render unconstitutional was plainly the Black Codes which took
away basic common law rights of property, contract, and inheritance from
113
the freed African Americans. The Black Codes set up a forbidden class
system not unlike the Hindu caste system or medieval European feudalism
where one class of citizens by birth had one set of privileges or immunities
while another class had a shortened or lesser set of those same privileges or
114
immunities. The setting up of such caste systems is thus plainly unconsti115
tutional, as Harrison argues.
But it does not follow that laws denying only one or a few individuals
privileges or immunities are constitutional. One can “abridge” or shorten or
lessen the rights of a single person as readily as one can abridge the rights of
a class of people. Indeed, the First Amendment uses the word “abridg[e]” in
exactly this sense. Surely, the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment must have been familiar with the First Amendment’s use of the
word “abridge.” Moreover, there is substantial evidence that the Framers of
the Amendment meant for the Amendment to protect the individual rights of
white northern Republicans living in the South—rights that were not threat116
ened by class-based discrimination. I thus think it is implausible as a
matter of textual interpretation to confine Section One of the Fourteenth
117
Amendment to an antidiscrimination command. The plain meaning of the
words of the Privileges or Immunities Clause also protects from “abridgment” individual rights so deeply rooted in history and tradition as of 1868
that they are ranked as being fundamental.

111.

Johnson’s Dictionary: An Anthology 47 (David Crystal ed., Penguin Books 2005).

112.

The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 4 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988).

113.

Brest et al., supra note 104, at 301–02.

114.

1 John Wilson, Indian Caste (photo reprint 2005) (1877).

115.

Harrison, supra note 91, at 1458.

116.

Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 21 (1998).

117.

Id. at 22–23.
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C. The Scope of Protection under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause
What might some of these rights include? I think rights protected by
more than three-fourths of the states in their state constitutions in 1868
might be viewed as being fundamental rights. Article V of the Constitution
suggests a rule of recognition of three-quarters of the states for determining
when there is a consensus about a matter that is sufficient to be of constitu118
tional import. I am in the process of writing a study of the state
constitutions as they existed in 1868 to see what rights were protected by
three-quarters of them, and what I have found so far is that one would find
in most of them protection for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
freedom of religion; protection against unreasonable searches and seizures;
and protection of private property against takings without just compensation. One does not find a three-quarters consensus for the exclusionary rule,
for Miranda warnings, for assisted suicide or for a right to engage in oral
119
and anal sex.
There probably was in 1868 a consensus of three-quarters of the states
that various common law rights were deeply rooted in history and tradition
and thus fundamental even if they were not mentioned in state constitutions,
but there also would have been a consensus that those rights could be regu120
lated in all sorts of ways by reasonable uses of the police power. It is
possible that the right to control the education of one’s own children or who
has visitation rights to see them was a fundamental right in 1868. It is cer121
tain that the right to marry and to have as many or as few children as one
might like to have were fundamental rights in 1868.
The inquiry does not end, however, with the recognition of a fundamental right. Was there a fundamental right to work in a bakery for more than
122
sixty hours a week, as Lochner v. New York so controversially held? Liberty of contract is plainly a fundamental right that is deeply rooted in history
and tradition. In fact, one of the objections the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had to the Black Codes was that they limited the liberty of con123
tract of the Freedmen. But, as the Corfield dicta show, fundamental rights
can be overridden by the police power with “just” laws “for the general
124
good of the whole.” Are maximum hours of work per week or minimum
wage laws valid publicly-interested legislation, or are they instances of special interest rent seeking? It is a debatable question—which means that, as a
118.

U.S. Const. art. V.
Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutional Law
in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in History and Tradition? (March 1, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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198 U.S. 45.
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Brest et al., supra note 104, at 301–09.
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Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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matter of judicial restraint, the legislature ought to have its way precisely as
125
Justice Holmes and the elder Justice Harlan said in their Lochner dissents.
The Constitution is enforced by legislators and executives when they make
laws just as much as it is by courts when they decide cases or controversies.
Accordingly, laws arrive at the door of the Supreme Court with a presumption of constitutionality. The evidence that maximum hours of work per
week or minimum wage laws are not for the general good of the whole is
sufficiently contested so that a court ought not to strike such laws down in
light of the presumption of constitutionality. This is true today, and it was
true when Lochner was decided in 1905.
I do not know how many states had maximum hours of employment
laws in 1905 like the New York law struck down in Lochner, but let us imagine for the moment that New York was in a category of one all by itself.
Suppose that New York was experimenting by introducing European-style
socialist ideas about labor-management relations—ideas that had not yet
been accepted in any other state. Ought the courts to use the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to shut down such novel
experiments because the state in question is an outlier given the then current
consensus?
I think the answer is no. The Corfield dicta allows for the police power
to trump fundamental rights whenever it is used justly on behalf of the general good of the whole. If a state is conducting a good faith experiment with
some novel use of the police power and the law in question has many proponents active in public life, the mere fact that only one state has chosen to
conduct the experiment ought not to cause the Supreme Court to shut that
126
127
experiment down. If Oregon wants to experiment with assisted suicide,
128
or Massachusetts wants to experiment with gay marriage, or if thirteen
states want to keep in place centuries-old proscriptions on oral and anal sex,
I think the implication of the Corfield dicta is that those experiments ought
to be allowed to continue. The issue of what laws are “just” exercises of
power “for the general good of the whole” is a political question in all but
the very clearest cases. Police power justifications for overriding freedom of
speech, of the press, and of religion might get closer judicial scrutiny on the
ground that the very functioning of democracy itself is imperiled by laws
that do such things. And laws that burden single individuals in grossly disproportionate ways, like uncompensated takings, might get special judicial
scrutiny because the political process cannot be expected to protect single
individuals and because such laws might be “unjust” and not for the “general” good of the whole. But the vast majority of state legislation would
survive judicial scrutiny under a fair application of the Corfield dicta.
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Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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What does all this suggest for the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy? I
think it shows he was on solid ground when he joined Glucksberg, dissented
in Troxel v. Granville, and upheld a partial birth abortion law in Gonzales v.
Carhart. I think he was standing on quicksand in Lawrence v. Texas when he
struck down laws banning oral and anal sex for being isolated outliers. The
Corfield dicta does not support Justice Kennedy’s idea that the Supreme
Court has a mopping up power anymore than it supported Ronald Dworkin
and William Brennan’s idea that the Court could invent new constitutional
129
rights. Kennedy’s mopping up power is a lot less dangerous than the
power Dworkin and Brennan claimed for the Court, but it is still illegitimate.
III. Constitutional Theory: Comparative Constitutional Law
as a Source of Substantive Due Process Rights
The Corfield dicta plainly does not allow the recognition of new fundamental rights that have not “been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union” since at least 1868. I think this means that
fundamental rights are not truly “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
unless they were recognized by three-quarters of the states in 1868. Thus, I
think, as I have argued in previous articles, that Lawrence was quite misguided to rely on comparative constitutional law in striking down laws
against oral and anal sex on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Lawrence effectively offers an additional source from which new substantive due
process rights might be derived beyond tradition and current day consensus.
That source is foreign constitutional law. For a variety of reasons, as I have
argued previously, I think it is not appropriate either as a legal matter or as a
policy matter for the U.S. Supreme Court to derive new substantive due
process rights from foreign constitutional law.
But what about the opposite kind of use of comparative constitutional
law? What about the claim that a law that violates some fundamental right
recognized by three-quarters of the states in 1868 ought nonetheless to be
upheld today because similar laws exist in other advanced Western democracies? The claim would be that the police power under Corfield extends to
allowing the passage of all “just” laws “for the general good of the whole”
and that a way of identifying what those laws are today might be looking at
the practice of other advanced Western democracies. It would be insane to
conclude that the police power extends only to those evils the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment were aware of and Corfield does not seem to discuss the police power that way. How do we figure out then what laws are
129. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447–55 (1972); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986). It might be objected that earlier I noted that Justices Harlan and White used the deeplyrooted-in-history-and-tradition approach to justify the Court’s mopping up opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut. If this was legitimate, the next question might be why not a mopping up operation in
Lawrence v. Texas? The answer is that the law in Griswold was much more unusual and anomalous
than the thirteen state laws struck down in Lawrence which were rooted in thousands of years of
history and tradition. Moreover, even Griswold is hard to justify relying on the Corfield dicta.
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“just” and for the “general good of the whole” if not by considering the
practice in other countries with legal systems related to our own? These
could be just the legal systems of English speaking peoples, as Justice Felix
130
Frankfurter liked to call them, or it could include all Western legal systems
more broadly. Is the idea of what laws are “just” or are “for the general good
of the whole” an idea that can be informed by reference to practice in
England, Canada, France, or Germany?
I do not think it is. I think the United States is a fundamentally different
country with different attitudes and different historical traditions from those
of the other Western democracies. I thus think it would be a huge mistake
for reasons of law, politics, and policy for the Supreme Court to allow its
understanding of the police power to be informed by the constitutional practice of other Western democracies. This is the case, first, because the United
States is in reality a very different country from the other Western democracies and, second, because that difference grows out of the United States’
very unique historical experience. I have discussed these points at great
131
length in a recent law review article in the Boston University Law Review,
so I will not repeat here what I said there. The bottom line is that America is
in fact, and has always thought of itself as being, an exceptional country. We
are a special people, with special laws, a special history, and a special calling in the world.
The best expression of the idea that America is an exceptional nation
comes the speeches given by Ronald Reagan, a former actor who acted in
many westerns. Reagan repeatedly and powerfully described America as
132
being “a shining city upon a hill.” In sum, I think there is no question that
rightly or wrongly, Americans for 400 years since the days of John Winthrop
have had a vision of this country as being a special place, with a special
people, with a special mission in the world. This is simply part of the public
ideology of being an American.
This brings me to my final point: What are the implications of the ideology and the reality of American exceptionalism for constitutional law? What
do the 400-year tradition of exceptionalist rhetoric and the enormous numbers of ways in which Americans are in reality exceptional suggest for our
constitutional law? Most especially, what does this suggest for the Supreme
Court’s practice of relying on foreign sources of law either in upholding or
in striking down U.S. statutes as unconstitutional?
I submit that the American Constitution is the focal point of the American exceptionalist creed. The Constitution is our Ark of the Covenant, the

130. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie D. Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 743, 822 (2005).
131.

Calabresi, American Exceptionalism, supra note *.

132. Governor Ronald Reagan, Address before the Conservative Political Action Committee
(Jan. 25, 1974), in 2 Classics of American Political and Constitutional Thought 852
(Scott J. Hammond et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.conservative.org/pressroom/reagan/
reagan1974.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
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holiest of holies of the new Israel that is America. Given the enormous
differences between the United States and England, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan, and given our unique history and self image, I think it
would be both improper and probably impossible for the Supreme Court to
construe the scope of the police power in substantive due process cases in
light of foreign constitutional law.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart this past term
makes it clear that the Glucksberg approach to substantive due process is the
approach lower federal and state courts—and the Supreme Court itself—
ought to follow in future substantive due process cases. The Court’s intervening decision in Lawrence has not displaced Glucksberg. It is itself an
outlier that neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal and state courts
are following. As a matter of the reigning doctrine, it is Glucksberg and not
Lawrence which accurately states the law. Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justice Alito all appear to believe that Glucksberg was right
when it called for judicial restraint in substantive due process case law and
for protecting only those rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition.
Given the original meaning of the various Clauses in Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Glucksberg opinion correctly states the rule
with respect to judicial protection of unenumerated rights. While the original meaning of the Due Process Clause is antithetical to the substantive due
process doctrine, a limited, modest substantive due process doctrine is correct as an original matter based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Under this doctrine, only rights that are so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and are so deeply rooted in history
and tradition that three-quarters of the states would have embraced them in
1868, should be constitutionally protected. And even these protected rights
can be trumped by just laws enacted for the general good of the whole.
Neither current-day consensus nor comparative constitutional law can or
ought to inform any aspect of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process
case law. The United States is an exceptional country both in its current
preferences and in its history. Both rule of law and policy considerations
suggest that the Supreme Court ought not to consider current-day consensus
or comparative constitutional law in substantive due process cases. The doctrine of the assisted suicide cases both is and ought to be alive and well on
the tenth anniversary of the Glucksberg decision. The Supreme Court’s intervening opinion in Lawrence is void for vagueness.

133. See Michael Kammen, A Machine that Would go of Itself: The Constitution in
American Culture (1986); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988).
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